Boundary of a Thinking Agent?: (Re-)Demarcating the Internal from the External

초록

Brie Gertler(2012) argues that there is no univocal thesis of externalism and internalism. She further maintains that the ambiguity in the terms “external” and “internal” is not eliminable, we will not be able to settle the criteria of “intrinsic to the thinker”. I agree with her on the conceptual ambiguity as a matter of fact. But it seems not only necessary but also possible to set up a reasonable definition for “in”. I will suggest such a criterion for demarcation of the internal (thus the external). This shall throw some guiding light on the debate about extended mind, Clark-Chalmers versus Adams-Aizawa. I will discuss some practical implications of this criteriology for ontology of intelligent artificial beings, for the categorization and individuation of (responsible) agents.